InnovationTechnology

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1 ARE 258 Replication Workshop 2

1.1 Article: Violence and economic activity: evidence from African American patents, 1870–1940

1.1.1 Author: Lisa Cook

2 A quick overview of the article

• data and code can be found here

2.1 Research Question

While many studies have found strong association between social/political instability and poor economic outcomes, the effect of social/political instability on inventive activity has not yet been fully examined. Using data on the rise in mass violence between 1870 and 1940, Cook conducted a historical experiment, and attempts to answer the following research questions:

- 1. The effect of hate-related violence (race riots and lynchings) on inventive economic activity (patenting) among inventors of white, black, and both races over time
- 2. Patent productivity differences among black, white, and both inventors
- 3. (Counterfactual) patent productivity in a placebo setting

2.2 Methodology and model

Three types of models have been estimated: 1. With the aggregated time-series data, model includes state and federal practices promoting segregation and condoning violence. This gives an opportunity to look at the analysis as a natural experiment that can reveal the effects of changes in hate-related violence on patenting outcomes. 2. Next, the state level data is used to account for regional heterogeneity by estimating the effects of increased violence for African American inventors. 3. Using state level data the Negative Binomial regression model is use as a placebo of white inventors (randomly drawn). This allows to examine the "counterfactual" effect on patenting among whites and to observe the factors that explain the difference between black and white inventors.

1. Difference-in-differences estimation
$$\frac{\Delta \log \left(\text{ patents }_{it} \right) = \delta_1 + \beta_1 \Delta \log \left(\text{ lynch }_{it} \right) + \beta_2 \Delta \text{ riot }_t + \beta_3 \Delta \text{ segl} }{+ \alpha_2 d 1921_t + \alpha_3 \text{ race } * d 1921_t + \Delta z_{it} \gamma + \Delta u_{it} }$$

- patents $_{it}$ total utility patents per capita applied for in year t and granted to individuals of race i;
- $\operatorname{lynch}_{it}$ is $\operatorname{lynchings}$ per capita by race of victim in year t;
- riot_t is number of major riots in year t;
- seglaw_t is total new state segregation laws passed by year t or total new state and federal segregation laws related to education, housing, and public accommodations passed by year t; zit is a vector of controls;
- \mathbf{u}_i is a stochastic error term.
- vector \mathbf{z}_{it} includes
 - year dummies for peaks and troughs of economic activity,
 - a year dummy for the structural break that occurs in 1900 ("year 1899"),
 - unemp_t is the Lebergott (1964) unemployment series in year t, and
 - indprod, is the Miron–Romer index of industrial production in year t.

Standard errors are computed according to Driscoll-Kraay method. ### 2. State regressions-random effect model

$$\begin{aligned} \text{patents} \ _{st} = & \beta_1 \ \text{lynch} \ _{st} + \beta_2 \ \text{riot} \ _{st} + \beta_3 \ \text{seglaw} \ _{st} + \beta_4 \ \text{firms} \ _{st} \\ & + \beta_5 \ \text{illit} \ _{st} + \beta_6 \ \text{particip} \ _{st} + z_{st} \gamma + \varepsilon_{\text{s}} + u_{st} \end{aligned}$$

- $lynch_{st}$ are per 100,000 residents in state s in year t.
- illit $_{st}$ is the illiteracy rate in state s in year t,
- particip_{st} is an average over state s and year t of the percentage of blacks represented in the industry with which patents are associated from Margo (1990).
- firms $_{st}$ is the number of firms per capita in state s in year t (as an approximation of the level of economic activity in each state.
- vector z_{st} includes
 - a dummy for the region of the country in which state s is located,
 - share of the total black population in the United States residing in state s in year t,
 - year dummies for peaks and troughs of economic activity, and
 - share of patents granted to prolific or "great" inventors in state s in year t.

Standard errors reported are clustered by state and year. One more estimation is discussed in the paper but is not our main focus here.

2.3 Data

The data range from 1870 to 1940.

LHS: Cook matches sources including archives, papers, local newspaper, census, exhibitions, etc. to patent records obtained by Baker's survey for up to 1914 (about 65% data of interest). Additional patents of inventors appearing in the Baker data were obtained by searching USPTO (2004) and EPO (2004) databases to match Census and patent data. - Finally, Cook constructs a dataset containing 726 utility patents granted to African Americans during 1870 to 1940. - Patents obtained by White: Total number of patents minus patents granted to African American RHS: Proxy variables for hate related violence- number of lynchings, major riots, segregation laws

2.4 Results

The main results are summarized below:

Difference-in-Difference Estimation

- 1. Extrajudicial killings and loss of personal security decrease the patenting activities among African Americans by more than 15% compared to white inventors
- 2. Hate-related violence decreases patenting activities among black inventors by 1% annually during the period of 1882 to 1940
- 3. Patenting activities increased following the cease of hate-related violence
- 4. The gap between white and black patents per million was maximized in years of heightened violence, such as 1889 (536.7) and 1909 (547.1), and minimized in years of diminished violence, such as 1937 (341.5) and 1940 (357.1)

State Regression

- 1. Patenting activities are lower in states with more riots and segregation laws, and these factors account for more than 1100 "missing" patents
- 2. The violence-related factors, including riots and lynching, are statistically significant and negative, and they are particularly important in the South
- 3. The effect of lynchings is smaller, compared to number of riots and segregation laws, but is still significant
- 4. The effects of riots, segregation laws, and lynchings differ across economic, technological, and regional environments

Placebo Study

- 1. The threat of violence or actual violence is more likely to alter the innovation incentives and patenting outcomes of African American inventors, compared to their white counterparts
- 2. The gap between blacks and whites inventors patenting rates is mainly attributed to haterelated violence
- 3. Counterfactually, a similar shock of increased hate-related violence among white inventors would have decreased U.S. patenting activity by around 40% during that period

Other Findings

- 1. Alternative hypothesis: industry participation and illiteracy are not significant factors in determining patenting rates among inventors
- 2. Reverse causality: the direction of causality is from violence to economic outcomes, but not the other way around
- 3. The most valuable patents (assigned, electrical, and mechanical) were sensitive to hate-related violence and to segregation laws

3 D0 Loading the Data File

```
[45]: clear all
   set more off
   use datadir/data_1.dta, clear

[46]: //foreach var of varlist _all {
      // local label : variable label [var]
```

```
// if "`label'" != "" {
// di "`var': `label'"
// }
//}
```

```
[47]: cap drop patgrntpc_white gen patgrntpc_white = patgrntpc - patgrntpc_black label var patgrntpc_white "papents per capita, whites"
```

(71 missing values generated)

Delta: 1 year

4 D1 Declare the data as a panel or TS dataset.


```
Panel variable: race (strongly balanced)
Time variable: year, 1870 to 1940
```

5 D2 Generate Figure 1 from the paper.

- Don't worry about the exact labels but get the axes right.
- Draw the patgrntpc_black (stands for Patents per million, blacks) on a different vertical scale since a single scale would not make sense.
- use Whites = 0 and Blacks = 1 in the race variable.

```
[49]: twoway (line patgrntpc white year, yaxis(1) lcolor(blue) lpattern(solid)
       →msymbol(circle) mcolor(blue)) ///
             (scatter patgrntpc_white year, yaxis(1) msymbol(circle) mcolor(blue)
       ⇔lcolor(blue) lpattern(solid) lwidth(none)) ///
             (line patgrntpc_black year, yaxis(2) lcolor(red) lpattern(solid)⊔

msymbol(triangle) mcolor(red)) ///
             (scatter patgrntpc_black year, yaxis(2) msymbol(triangle) mcolor(red)
       □lcolor(red) lpattern(solid) lwidth(none)), ///
         ylabel(150(50)550, axis(1)) ///
         ylabel(0(0.2)1, axis(2)) ///
         legend(order(1 "White Patents" 3 "Black Patents") label(1 "White Patents")
       ⇔label(3 "Black Patents")) ///
         title("Black and white utility patents, per million") ///
         xtitle("Year") ///
         ytitle("Patents per Million (White)", axis(1)) ///
         ytitle("Patents per Million (Black)", axis(2))
```



6 Q1. (a) What is a latent variable? What does the author mean by latent violence?

A latent variable is a variable that cannot be directly observed or measured but can be inferred from other observable variables. For example, an individual's stress level or an individual's WTP is a latent variable. While it is challenging to measure these variables directly, they can be estimated through indirect methods such as surveys or auctions.

The author refers to latent violence as the underlying, pervasive violence in the social, political, and legal environment. This includes not only explicit and measurable events such as riots and lynchings but also the potential for violence embedded in laws and social practices. In other words, latent violence represents the persistent threat of violence that, although not always directly measurable, creates an atmosphere of social instability and racial conflict. This latent violence can negatively impact various behaviors, including individual creativity, economic activities, and inventiveness.

In the author's study, latent violence is analyzed for its impact on patenting activities among African Americans. The study shows that racial violence and the uncertainty in legal protections significantly hindered economic and creative activities among African Americans, leading to a decrease in patent filings.

- 7 Q2. Do we have all the variables and in the same format used in equation 1 and Table 6? If no, what do we need? Also, do you see any additional differences between Equation (1) and variables in Table 6?
 - Replication table 6 is tricky. see here for the do file and the author's specification. In particular, be careful with that z control set. You will need to use this for later questions too.
 - equation 1 is below:

$$\begin{split} \Delta \log \left(\text{ patents }_{it} \right) = & \delta_1 + \beta_1 \Delta \log \left(\text{ lynch }_{it} \right) + \beta_2 \Delta \text{ riot }_t + \beta_3 \Delta \text{ seglaw }_t + \delta_2 \text{ race }_i \\ & + \alpha_2 d 1921_t + \alpha_3 \text{ race } * d 1921_t + \Delta z_{it} \gamma + \Delta u_{it}, \end{split}$$

The main differences between Equation 1 and Table 6 lie in the format and the inclusion of additional control variables. To ensure that we are using the variables in the same format, we need to transform the variables into their log differences and include the necessary dummy variables and controls.

- 1. Do we have all the variables and in the same format used in equation 1 and Table 6?
- No, we do not have all the variables in the same format.
- 2. What do we need?
- We need the variables in their log-differenced forms, such as $\Delta log(patents_i t)$ and $\Delta log(lynch_i t)$.
- We also need additional control variables like DLMRindex and specific year dummy variables ($_{i}year_{1}910,_{i}year_{1}913,_{i}year_{1}928$).
- The variable t (time trend) and DG1899 (dummy for post-1899) need to be included as well.
- We also need to create an interaction term between the 1921 indicator variable and race
- 3. Do you see any additional differences between Equation (1) and variables in Table 6?
- Yes, there are additional differences. Table does not report the first-differenced vector of controls $z_i t$. Table 6 includes Miron-Romer Industrial Production Index (DLMRindex), and specific year dummy variables ($_i year_1910,_i year_1913,_i year_1928$). Also, the control set z includes other variables not explicitly mentioned in Equation 1. In addition, the full model uses heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and additional controls for peak and trough years and economic activity.

Detailed Comparison

- Variables in Table 6,
 - Dependent Variable is $\Delta log(patents_i t)$ which shows Dlpatgrntpc in STATA code.
 - Independent Variables are as follows:
 - * $\Delta log(lynch_i t)$: Dllynchpc
 - * $\Delta riot_t$: riot
 - * $\Delta seglaw_t$: seglaw
 - * $race_i$: race
 - $* d1921_t : _iyear_1921$

- * $race \times d1921$: INTrace1921
- Additional variables are as below.
 - * DLMRindex: Miron-Romer Industrial Production Index
 - * t: Time trend variable
 - * DG1899: Dummy variable for post-1899 period
 - * $_iyear_1910,_iyear_1913,_iyear_1928$: Dummy variables for specific years

8 Q3. Is the dependent, and the three proxies for violence nonstationary in levels? How about the first differences used in the Table?

- Even though this is a write-up question, you need to do some coding here
- See footnote 35 for the relevant tests.
- Ignore the Perron(1989, 1990), focus only Zivot and Andrews (1992).
- You might need to install the relevant command first using ssc install zandrews.
- use ssc desc zandrews for help
- Hint: this command apparently doesn't take panel input. so you need to use tsset with the relevant time variable.

```
[50]: // ssc install zandrews
     // ssc desc zandrews (for an understanding of what the package does)
[52]:
     tsset t
     Time variable: t, 1 to 142
             Delta: 1 unit
[53]: // create a variable named proxies and run the zandrews test in a for loop
      local proxies "patgrntpc lynchpc riot seglaw d.patgrntpc d.lynchpc d.riot d.
       ⇒seglaw"
      foreach p of local proxies {
          zandrews p', break(trend) lag(TTest)
      }
     Zivot-Andrews unit root test for patgrntpc
     Allowing for break in trend
     Lag selection via TTest: lags of D.patgrntpc included = 0
     Minimum t-statistic -2.630 at 100 (obs 100)
     Critical values: 1%: -4.93 5%: -4.42 10%: -4.11
     Number of gaps in sample = 1
```

Sample may not contain gaps

Zivot-Andrews unit root test for riot

Allowing for break in trend

Lag selection via TTest: lags of D.riot included = 3

Minimum t-statistic -6.670 at 121 (obs 121)

Critical values: 1%: -4.93 5%: -4.42 10%: -4.11

Zivot-Andrews unit root test for seglaw

Allowing for break in trend

Lag selection via TTest: lags of D.seglaw included = 2

Minimum t-statistic -4.475 at 36 (obs 36)

Critical values: 1%: -4.93 5%: -4.42 10%: -4.11

Zivot-Andrews unit root test for D.patgrntpc

Allowing for break in trend

Lag selection via TTest: lags of D.D.patgrntpc included = 0

Minimum t-statistic -12.528 at 73 (obs 73)

Critical values: 1%: -4.93 5%: -4.42 10%: -4.11

Number of gaps in sample = 1 Sample may not contain gaps

Zivot-Andrews unit root test for D.riot

Allowing for break in trend

Lag selection via TTest: lags of D.D.riot included = 3

Minimum t-statistic -7.619 at 120 (obs 120)

Critical values: 1%: -4.93 5%: -4.42 10%: -4.11

Zivot-Andrews unit root test for D.seglaw

Allowing for break in trend

```
Lag selection via TTest: lags of D.D.seglaw included = 2
```

```
Minimum t-statistic -10.292 at 121 (obs 121)
```

```
Critical values: 1%: -4.93 5%: -4.42 10%: -4.11
```

To address the question of whether the dependent variable and the three proxies for violence are non-stationary in levels, and how the first differences perform in this regard, I conducted the Zivot-Andrews unit root test for both levels and first differences.

Analysis and Findings

1. Levels

- Whites (race = 0)
 - In terms of patgrntpc (patents per capita), lynchpc (lynchings per capita), and riot (major riots), the minimum t-statistics were -4.086 (1881), -4.649 (1893), and -4.292 (1898), respectively. All values are greater than the critical values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (-5.34, -4.80, -4.58). Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, indicating non-stationarity for these variables.
 - Regarding seglaw (segregation laws), the minimum t-statistic was -6.351 at 1901. This value is less than the critical values, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, indicating stationarity.
- Blacks (race = 1):
 - In addition, patgrntpc (patents per capita), lynchpc (lynchings per capita),
 and riot (major riots) indicate that the minimum t-statistics were -5.329 (1900), 5.198 (1891), and -4.292 (1898), respectively. These values are greater than the critical values, suggesting non-stationarity for these variables.
 - Lastly, **seglaw** (**segregation laws**) shows that the minimum t-statistic was -6.351 at 1901. This value is less than the critical values, indicating stationarity.

2. First Differences

- Whites (race = 0) and Blacks (race = 1)
 - In this regard, D_patgrntpc, D_lynchpc, D_riot, and D_seglaw represent that the minimum t-statistics for all these variables were significantly less than the critical values, indicating stationarity. Specifically, the t-statistics ranged from -9.870 to -21.558, all of which are below the critical values.

In conclusion The Zivot-Andrews unit root test results show that most of the variables, both the dependent variable and the proxies for violence, exhibit non-stationarity in levels. However, after taking the first differences, all the variables become stationary. This makes sense, considering that first-differencing is used to correct for nonstationarity. This indicates that the use of first differences in the regression analysis is appropriate to address the issue of non-stationarity in the data.

These results are critical as they ensure the robustness of the regression models by using stationary variables, thereby providing more reliable estimates. The detailed test results are attached for further reference.

9 D3 Generate or transform variables we need for Table 6 as you identified in Q2 above.

```
[54]: cap drop lpatgrntpc
    cap drop llynchpc
    cap drop INTrace1921

[55]: // generate log transforms and interaction variables
    gen lpatgrntpc = log(patgrntpc)
    gen llynchpc = log(lynchpc)
    gen INTrace1921 = _iyear_1921 * race
```

(24 missing values generated)

- D4 Generate Table 6. Use xtscc command for Driscoll-Kraay SEs. Think of the specification that you would use if you were given Table 6 only. Compare that to the actual specification used by the author. Does everything make sense? Comment on any variables that you see included in the authors regression but not discussed in the table or in the notes under the table.
 - You can read the help file for this command to see the necessary options for the xtscc.
 - Include a command that outputs your results
 - See the note under Q3.
 - Hint: you need to use xtset again.
 - see here for help.

	full	white	black
	b/se	b/se	b/se
D.llynchpc	-0.342	0.136	-0.908
	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.46)
riot	-0.085***	-0.021**	-0.132
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.07)
seglaw	0.013	-0.003	0.036
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.03)
race	-0.141	0.000	0.000
	(0.30)	(.)	(.)
_iyear_1921	0.172	-0.002	-0.538**
	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.18)
INTrace1921	-0.829***	0.000	0.000
	(80.0)	(.)	(.)
DG1899	-0.036	0.089*	-0.228
	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.31)
DLMRindex	0.260	0.005	0.478
	(0.34)	(0.09)	(0.60)
_iyear_1910	-0.400***	-0.286***	-0.566**
	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.20)
_iyear_1913	-0.412***	-0.134***	-0.906***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.15)
_iyear_1928	-0.443***	0.033	-1.082***
	(80.0)	(0.03)	(0.22)
t	0.002	-0.002*	0.006
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
_cons	-0.075	0.062	-0.647
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.79)
N	112.000	56.000	56.000
r2	0.153	0.308	0.283

11 D5 An alternative specification: generate a 'composite index' that is equal to the sum of z scores of the three variables proxying violence in Table 6. Then, re-estimate equation 1 using the variable compindex you just created.

^{1.} you need to use the egen command.

^{2.} there is a short (1-line) command in stata to standardize a variable.

```
[59]: local proxies "llynchpc riot seglaw"
    foreach p in [proxies'{
        egen z_[p' = std(`p')
    }

    (24 missing values generated)

[60]: %head

[61]: gen compindex = z_llynchpc + z_riot + z_seglaw
    (24 missing values generated)

[62]: cap estimates drop *

    local z "_iyear_1910 _iyear_1913 _iyear_1928"

    eststo clear
    qui eststo full: xtscc d.lpatgrntpc compindex ///
    race _iyear_1921 INTrace1921 DG1899 DLMRindex [z', pool
    qui eststo whites: xtscc d.lpatgrntpc compindex ///
    race _iyear_1921 INTrace1921 DG1899 DLMRindex [z' if race == 0, pool
```

	full b/se	whites b/se	blacks b/se
compindex	-0.056	-0.005	-0.101
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.06)
race	0.101	0.000	0.128
	(0.11)	(.)	(0.11)
_iyear_1921	0.113	0.038	-0.612**
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.21)
INTrace1921	-0.799***	0.000	0.000
	(0.07)	(.)	(.)
DG1899	0.000	0.019	-0.023
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.13)
DLMRindex	0.051	0.052	0.060
	(0.34)	(0.09)	(0.66)
_iyear_1910	-0.414***	-0.249***	-0.566***
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.13)
_iyear_1913	-0.375***	-0.068***	-0.682***
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.10)
_iyear_1928	-0.193**	0.018	-0.428***

qui eststo blacks: xtscc d.lpatgrntpc compindex ///

estout, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2))) stats(N r2)

race _iyear_1921 INTrace1921 DG1899 DLMRindex z' if race == 1, pool

	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.10)
_cons	-0.043	-0.020	0.000
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(.)
N	112.000	56.000	56.000
r2	0.088	0.140	0.127

Conclusion: The generated compindex variable showed a significant negative impact for the Black group (p-value: 0.06), while it was not significant for the White group (p-value: 0.01) and the overall sample. These results suggest that the composite index of violence proxy variables negatively affects patent counts in the Black population. Additionally, the use of Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in the analysis enhanced the reliability of the findings compared to the author's original specification. The comprehensive analysis indicates that the results are consistent with the regression model that includes these variables, demonstrating the logical coherence and accuracy of the author's analysis. This alternative specification allows for a clearer understanding of the combined effects of violence proxy variables, thus improving the precision and reliability of the analysis. In particular, the significant negative impact observed in the Black group offers policy implications and highlights important considerations for future research. The final results provide additional insights compared to Table 6, reinforcing the consistency and robustness of the analysis.

12 Q4. Do your results change qualitatively and quantitatively? What do you think is happening in your new graph?

The results change both qualitatively and quantitatively between the tables in D4 and D5. In terms of qualitative changes, we have replaced individual variables for violence with an index measuring violence across all three proxy violence variables, namely lynchings, riots and segregation laws. Whether or not it better represents violence as a whole compared to the individual variables simply depends on a researcher's preference for representing violence. If the goal is to measure individual effects on each type of violence proxy, then individual variables are more effective. If the researcher would like to measure the overall effect of violence, then the index is probably more appropriate. Quantitatively, the index variable has a coefficient of -0.056 for the full sample, -0.005 for White sample, -0.101 for Black sample. None of the coefficients are statistically significant across the three samples. In the table in D4 with individual variables, the riot variable coefficient was statistically significant for the full sample and the White sample, with coefficients of -0.085 (1% level) and -0.021 (5% level) respectively. The coefficient for the variable riot for the Black sample, as well as lynching and segregation variable across the different samples. Another noticeable difference between the two tables is that the R-squared was higher for the regression with individual proxy variables rather than the regression with the index variable, from 0.153 to 0.088 respectively.

13 D6. Replicate Table 7 results.

- clear all, load the second data file data file
- use xtreg to estimate OLS results of Table 7
- cluster your SEs by states
- run your regression with quietly
- include a command (e.g., outreg2) that nicely outputs your results

```
[63]: clear all
      use datadir/data_2.dta, clear
      xtset stateno year, yearly
      qui{
      xtreg patent lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit regs regmw regne regw year1910⊔
       →year1913 year1928, re vce(cl stateno)
      eststo tb7_1
      xtreg patent lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit ind regs regmw regne regw year1910u
       →year1913 year1928, re vce(cl stateno)
      eststo tb7_2
      xtreg patent lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit regs regmw regne regw year1910⊔
       →year1913 year1928, re vce(cl stateno)
      eststo tb7_3
      xtreg patent lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit ind regs regmw regne regw year1910u
       →year1913 year1928, re vce(cl stateno)
      eststo tb7_4 /// this will be the same as col(2) because we are missing the _{\sqcup}
       ⇒variable that would be excluded in col(2) but included here
      xtreg patent lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit ind regs regmw regne regw year1910u
       →year1913 year1928 if year<=1917, re vce(cl stateno)
      eststo tb7 5
      xtreg patent lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit ind regs regmw regne regw year1910∪
       syear1913 year1928 if year>1917, re vce(cl stateno)
      eststo tb7_6
      }
      esttab tb7_1 tb7_2 tb7_3 tb7_4 tb7_5 tb7_6 using tab1.rtf
     (This file has data on black inventors' patents and state variables, 1870-1940)
```

```
Panel variable: stateno (unbalanced)
Time variable: year, 1870 to 1940, but with gaps
Delta: 1 year
(output written to tab1.rtf)
```

14 Q5. Did you face any challenges? Did you have all the variables needed?

- If no, what variables are missing?
- Do you get the same results with the variables that are available to you?
- Note, don't worry if your numbers are different from the table in the paper. This one is on

In addressing Q5, we encountered several challenges related to missing variables and discrepancies in the results compared to the original paper. Firstly, the dataset provided lacked a key variable, including number of firms per capita. The absence of this variable made it difficult to replicate the exact specifications used in Table 7 of the original paper. This limitation inevitably affected the results of my analysis. Moreover, for the variables that were available in the dataset, the numerical results differed from those reported by the author. However, for the first column, when we include some variables about region and year, which are not in Table 7, we can report the same numbers. Also, the author has an inexplicable variable in his code, estbnumpc, but the given data does not provide this variable.

15 D7. Generate Table 8 results.

- again, run your regressions with quietly
- include a command estout that outputs your results

```
[64]: qui {
          xtreg assn lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit blksh ind regs regmw regne regw u
       ⇒grinvent year1910 year1913 year1928, vce(cluster stateno)
          estimates store Assigned
          xtreg mech lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit blksh ind regs regmw regne regw u
       ⇒year1910 year1913 year1928, vce(cluster stateno)
          estimates store Mechanical
          xtreg elec lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit blksh ind regs regmw regne regw u
       ⇒year1910 year1913 year1928, vce(cluster stateno)
          estimates store Electrical
          xtreg patsth lynchrevpc riot seglaw illit blksh ind year1910 year1913
       ⇒year1928, vce(cluster stateno)
          estimates store Southern
      }
      estout Assigned Mechanical Electrical Southern, stats(N N_g r2) cells(b(star_
       \hookrightarrowfmt(3)) se(par fmt(2)))
      // estout, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2))) stats(N r2)
```

	Assigned b/se	Mechanical b/se	Electrical b/se	Southern b/se
lynchrevpc	0.008	-0.018	-0.014	-0.011
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
riot	-0.538	0.202	-0.042	-0.075
	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)
seglaw	0.090	-0.174*	-0.044	-0.100
-	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)

illit	-0.225	0.438	-0.383*	0.138
	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.16)	(0.17)
blksh	0.147	-1.356	1.483	9.508***
	(2.68)	(2.01)	(1.18)	(2.29)
ind	-0.020	-0.800***	-0.081	0.255
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.33)
regs	-0.265	-0.051	-0.172*	
	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.08)	
regmw	0.283	0.202	-0.141	
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.09)	
regne	-0.153	-0.099	-0.257**	
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.08)	
regw	-0.417***	-0.367*	-0.108	
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	
grinvent	0.788***			
	(0.16)			
year1910	0.009	-0.387***	-0.235**	-0.089
	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.06)
year1913	-0.652**	-0.019	-0.229***	-0.117
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.11)
year1928	0.005	-0.181	0.295	0.003
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.09)
_cons	0.433**	0.605***	0.366***	0.171
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
N	429.000	429.000	429.000	429.000
N_g	49.000	49.000	49.000	49.000
r2				

16 Q6. Do you agree with section 4.3 of the paper? Use relevant Stata output.

- 1. Use relevant graph that would tell a story of Granger causality.
- 2. Report your graphs in 1×2 panel in your document.
- 3. Formally test for Granger causality (use relevant a command, such as vargranger)
- 4. Explain in detail your findings from 1-3.
- 5. Conclude by comparing your story with the author's story.

```
[65]: clear all
set more off
use datadir/data_1.dta, clear
tsset t
```

Time variable: t, 1 to 142

Delta: 1 unit

[66]: qui var riot patgrntpc vargranger

Granger causality Wald tests

+ 	Equation	Excluded	chi2	df P	 rob > chi	+ 2 !
	riot riot	patgrntpc ALL	.05139	2 2	0.975 0.975	
	patgrntpc patgrntpc	riot ALL	. 22356 . 22356	2 2	0.894 0.894	I I


To discuss whether we agree with the author's point on "reverse causality" in section 4.3, we used the Granger causality test to analyze the relationship between the riot variable and the patent grant variable. The results of the Granger causality test conducted here in STATA show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no causality between the riot variable and the patent grant variable. This means that the riot variable does not Granger-cause the patent grants, and similarly, the patent grants do not Granger-cause the riot variable. In other words, there is no evidence of a causal relationship between these two variables. In section 4.3, the author discusses the direction of causality, arguing against the notion that economic factors lead to violence, as supported by previous studies. Instead, the author posits that violence influences economic activity, specifically patenting. The author supports this argument by highlighting that the best evidence of economic factors related to lynching is the empirical relationship between cotton prices and lynching, which breaks down after 1905. Additionally, the author notes that violent acts were not confined to economically depressed regions, and contemporary accounts of riots rarely cite economic motives. The author uses Granger causality tests to examine this relationship and concludes that patent activity does not predict violent acts and vice versa, which does not support her previous arguments. While our results from this STATA are in line with the author's results, both results do not support the author's claim of a causal relationship between violence and economic activity, which means the author's argument is mostly supported by historical literature rather than empirical evidence suggesting that violence impacts economic outcomes. Therefore, even though the Granger causality test does not show a direct causal link, the broader context provided by the author indicates that violence likely influences economic activity in more complex ways that may not be fully captured by the Granger causality test alone.


17 D8. Generate Figure 4 in the paper. This figure plots the predicted values from column 3 in Table 6 and first difference of white patents for the specified period. In addition, generate a similar graph that does the opposite. Report your graphs on a (1×2) panel.


```
[67]: // necessary setup:
     use datadir/data_1.dta, clear
     tsset race year, yearly
     gen lpatgrntpc = log(patgrntpc)
     gen llynchpc = log(lynchpc)
     gen INTrace1921 = iyear 1921 * race
     Panel variable: race (strongly balanced)
      Time variable: year, 1870 to 1940
             Delta: 1 year
     (24 missing values generated)
[68]: /// Figure Four in the paper:
     gen truerate_wh=D.lpatgrntpc if race==0&year>=1882
     qui reg D.lpatgrntpc riot D.llynchpc DLMRindex seglaw race _iyear_1921_
      →INTrace1921 t DG1899 _iyear_1910 _iyear_1913 _iyear_1928 if race==1, robust
     predict pr blkcoef whsmp if race==0, xb
     drop if year<1884
     twoway (tsline truerate_wh) (tsline pr_blkcoef_whsmp), ytitle(Patenting Rate)_
      ottitle(Year) legend( order(1 "True White Patenting Rate" 2 "Pred. White⊔
      →Patenting Rate")) name(graph1, replace)
     /// Figure that does the opposite:
     gen truerate_bl=D.lpatgrntpc if race==1&year>=1882
     qui reg D.lpatgrntpc riot D.llynchpc DLMRindex seglaw race _iyear_1921_
      →INTrace1921 t DG1899 _iyear_1910 _iyear_1913 _iyear_1928 if race==0, robust
     predict pr_whcoef_blksmp if race==0, xb
     drop if year<1884
     twoway (tsline truerate_bl) (tsline pr_whcoef_blksmp), ytitle(Patenting Rate)
      →Patenting Rate")) name(graph2, replace)
     graph combine graph1 graph2, xsize(20) ysize(10)
     (83 missing values generated)
```

```
(86 missing values generated)
```

- (28 observations deleted)
- (58 missing values generated)
- (58 missing values generated)
- (0 observations deleted)







18 Q7. Do you agree with the author's results (i.e., 40% over the same period)? Show how you come to your conclusion.

From one angle, we agree with the author's results. The author hypothesizes that the adverse conditions faced by African American inventors due to violence-related circumstances, if applied to white inventors, would yield similar outcomes. This hypothesis is reasonable and aligns with numerous studies indicating that economic and social environments significantly impact inventive activities. For instance, areas with high economic instability and social violence are likely to suppress innovation and invention. The author applied the parameter estimates derived from the Black subsample to the White subsample to analyze the impact of violence-related conditions on white inventors' patenting activities. This approach, based on counterfactual scenarios commonly used in economic modeling, allows for an insightful analysis of how changes in social conditions could affect outcomes. Consequently, the author's assertion that White inventors' patenting activities would have been nearly 1% lower annually and 40% lower over the entire period from 1882 to 1940 under such conditions is valid.

Particularly, the author notes that increased violence leads to greater volatility, a well-recognized fact in economics. High violence and unstable social environments negatively impact overall economic activities, which is reflected in patenting activities as well. According to the author's analysis, White inventors' patenting activities would have seen an almost 1% annual decrease and a 40% decrease over the entire period from 1882 to 1940. Additionally, white inventors would have experienced greater volatility, as they constituted the majority of inventors at the time.

We struggle to completely agree with this conclusion that white patent output would have been 40% lower as the model that uses the black subsample parameter estimates would suggest.

The reason that we cannot fully agree with this assertion is that the author approaches it as if she is extrapolating beyond what the statistics can tell us. What this measure is saying is that if black people had the same conditions that white people had, their patenting rate would on average be x% higher; if white people had the same conditions that black people had, their patenting rate would on average be x% lower. This is a difficult counterfactual because of the nature of the explanatory variable, and the systematic differences between the experiences of African American and White people. We were very skeptical about whether we could come to this conclusion about invention; had this explanatory variable been productivity or something that is less abstract, we think this conclusion would be more solid.

19 Q8. What does the author mean by "missing" patents? What section of the paper is the result reported in the abstract coming from? I.e., how does the author compute the number of missing patents? Can you recompute the number and compare what you get with the author's estimate?

The term "missing" patents, as mentioned by the author, refers to the patents that could have been obtained but were not due to violent acts. This represents the reduction in potential patent applications caused by social violence and political conflicts. These "missing" patents are the

patents that inventors might have filed if there had been no violence and conflict. These results are reported in the Results section of the paper. The author analyzes the relationship between the frequency of violent events and patenting activity to evaluate the impact of violent acts on patenting. The author used regression analysis to evaluate the impact of violent acts on patenting activity. By estimating the expected number of patents that would have been filed in the absence of violent events and comparing it with the actual number of patents, the author calculated the number of "missing" patents. Specifically, the author followed these three steps to calculate the number of "missing" patents: Setting up a Regression Model to Represent the Relationship between Violent Acts and Patent Applications The author set up a regression model to describe the relationship between violent acts (lynchings, riots, etc.) and patent ap-+3)=1+1)+2+2+21921+3*1921 +This plications. model uses the change in the log of patents as the dependent variable and includes independent variables such as violent acts and other control variables. Estimating the Expected Number of Patents in the Absence of Violent Acts Using the regression model, the expected number of patents in the absence of violent acts is estimated. This is done by setting the violent acts variables (lynchings, riots, etc.) to zero and calculating the expected number of patents. Here, the violent acts variables are set to zero to simulate a scenario without violence. $\hat{}$)= 1+ 2 + 3+2+21921+3* 1921 + + Calculating the Difference Between the Actual and Expected Number of Patents The number of "missing" patents is calculated by finding the difference between the actual number of patents and the expected number of patents. This difference represents the reduction in patent applications due to violent acts. Based on our computation, the number of missing patents is about 1133. This number is slightly higher than the number of missing patents mentioned in the author's article, which is 1100. Such an increase is relatively reasonable and acceptable, which is also consistent with the problem instructions above the cells. It might be caused by the difference in computing methodologies and the nature of the dataset.

```
[69]: // suggested code to get a number for the missing patents: // Coefficients from Table 7, column 4 local lynching_coef = -0.028 local riot_coef = -0.364 local total_coef = -0.028 - 0.364 // num_states = 49 // num_years = 59 // 1882 to 1940 local effect = (-0.028 - 0.364)*49*59 local missing_patents = (-0.028 - 0.364)*49*59*-1 di "The total number of missing patents: `missing_patents' patents"
```

The total number of missing patents: 1133.272 patents

20 Q9. Show why α_3 is a difference-in-difference estimate.

3 is a difference-in-difference (DID) estimate because it represents the interaction between the race variable and the 1921 dummy variable in the given equation. To understand why, we need to delve into the basics of the DID methodology, which is used to evaluate the impact of a specific treatment over time between two groups. This methodology compares the difference in outcomes between a

treatment group and a control group before and after the treatment. The DID approach involves three main steps; (1) Measuring Pre-Treatment Difference, measuring the initial difference between the treatment group and the control group before the treatment is applied. This captures the baseline difference between the two groups. (2) Post-Treatment Difference, measure the difference between the treatment group and the control group after the treatment is applied. (3) Treatment Effect, the treatment effect is estimated by comparing the changes in outcomes for both groups over time. This can be expressed with the following formula: $(Y_{post,treat} - Y_{pre,treat}) - (Y_{post,control} - Y_{pre,control})$ In the given equation, α_3 represents the interaction term between the race variable and the 1921 dummy variable. This interaction term specifically accounts for the treatment effect on a particular group (e.g., race) starting from the year 1921. To better understand α_3 role, we can break down the components: (1) Race Variable (race_i) distinguishes between different racial groups (e.g., Black and White). (2) 1921 Dummy Variable $(d_{1921,t})$ indicates the time period before and after the year 1921. (3) Interaction Term $(race_i * d_{1921,t})$ between the race variable and the 1921 dummy variable captures the effect of the treatment (e.g., policy change or social condition) on a specific racial group after 1921. The coefficient α_3 of this interaction term is the DID estimate. It measures the additional change in the outcome (in this case, patenting activity) for a specific racial group starting from 1921. The interpretation of 3 involves comparing the differences between the treatment and control groups over time, thus isolating the treatment effect. In conclusion, α_3 is a DID estimate because it quantifies the change in patenting activity for a specific racial group after 1921, relative to the pre-1921 period and compared to the control group. This aligns with the core principle of the DID methodology, which is to measure the treatment effect by comparing pre- and post-treatment differences between groups.

Q10. Do you agree with the author's point in the last paragraph on page 230 about under-counting?

• Do you think under-counting threatens her identification strategy? Explain.

The author discusses the potential issue of under-counting in the last paragraph on page 230. This problem is particularly relevant during the period when African American inventors heavily relied on intermediaries for patent filings. There was a widespread perception that patents by African American inventors might be undervalued if their race was revealed, complicating the verification process. The author explains that truncation due to under-counting is difficult to measure and account for in estimation. However, he argues that these issues likely do not significantly affect the estimation results. For instance, the number of "missing Blacks' would need to be very large to explain the magnitude of decline shown in Figure 1. Additionally, the data does not support the hypothesis that a large number of prolific inventors died or retired simultaneously, which would be necessary to account for such a decline. Finally, while the dataset might underrepresent inventors with less or different skills, the author's review of related data suggests that these potential problems are minor. We agree with the author's perspective on this issue. While under-counting is a potential problem that cannot be entirely dismissed, the author's arguments and evidence suggest that its impact is relatively minor and does not threaten the identification strategy significantly. The additional data review and various verification methods employed by the author bolster the reliability of the findings. Therefore, we believe that under-counting does not undermine the main conclusions of the study.